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Private banks often blame state guarantees to distort competition by giv-
ing public banks the advantage of lower funding costs. In this paper I show
that if borrowers perceive the public bank as supporting economic develop-
ment, private banks may be able to separate ¯rms by self selection, enter the
market, and obtain pro¯ts in equilibrium despite their cost disadvantage. The
public bank's competitive advantage may be o®set, independently of what its
true objective function is. Even perfect competition between private banks
does not lead to zero pro¯ts.
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11 Introduction
Public banks that hold state guarantees on their deposits often enjoy lower funding
costs than private banks in the same market. Wherever this is the case, this cost
di®erence tends to be blamed to distort competition in favor of the public bank.
In this paper, I show that the support of the state may turn out to be a disadvan-
tage for the public bank. The reason is that public (i.e., state-owned) and private
banks do not only di®er in funding costs, but also in their perceived objective
function. To what extent the true objective functions di®er is subject to debate.
But public banks usually have the mandate to support the economy, which they
cannot publicly breach. Accordingly, most borrowers assume that if they take out
a loan from the public bank their ¯rm will not get liquidated at the ¯rst sign of
¯nancial di±culties. Independently of the public bank's true objective function
this perception may su±ce to allow private banks to enter the market, separate
the borrower pool, and obtain pro¯ts in equilibrium. What was meant as a policy
to support the economy may turn out to increase the interest rates for all borrow-
ers. Interestingly, even perfect competition between private banks does not drive
pro¯ts to zero, or interest rates to a minimum.
Consider a loan market with safe and risky ¯rms, where risky ¯rms are those
that have a higher probability of experiencing ¯nancial distress. The incumbent
public bank initially serves the whole market at a uniform pooling rate. Now the
market opens for competition. If private banks have higher funding costs but are
otherwise equal to the public bank, their loan o®ers are not competitive, and the
public bank continues to serve the whole market. This is the stylized case that
may be cited to show the adverse e®ect of state guarantees.
However, since private banks are not restricted in setting their policy, they can
o®er a contract that includes the liquidation of all borrowers in ¯nancial distress
but an interest rate lower than that of the public bank. Due to its mandate, the
public bank cannot compete by o®ering a similar contract. The private banks'
loan is more attractive for safe than for risky ¯rms, since risky ¯rms have a higher
probability of being in ¯nancial distress, that is, a higher probability of ine±cient
liquidation under the private banks' loan. Hence, private banks can induce ¯rms
to separate by self-selection and lend only to safe ¯rms. Safe ¯rms produce higher
expected returns, such that the private banks can o®er lower interest rates than
the public bank and still overcome their cost disadvantage. The public bank is
left with the risky ¯rms.
This result is con¯rmed by data on the German loan market for small and medium-
sized ¯rms. It shows that a relatively higher share of ¯rms with a low (self-
reported) degree of creditworthiness borrow from public banks (73%) than from
private banks (19% ). For ¯rms with a high (self-reported) degree of creditwor-
2thiness, the di®erence is less pronounced (51% vs. 30%) (Paul et al, 2007). This
tendency is consistent with data which shows that especially very small ¯rms (up
to 10 employees), which are usually seen as being risky, tend to borrow from public
banks (BDS/DGV, 2007).
A key component of the private banks' strategy to separate ¯rm types is the
credibility of their threat to liquidate all ¯rms in ¯nancial distress. Since their
lower interest rate attracts all ¯rms, only the liquidation threat keeps risky ¯rms
from applying for their loans. Accordingly, private banks have to develop a long-
term strategy, and ensure that the pro¯ts from repeatedly lending to safe ¯rms
exceed the one-time pro¯ts from extending the loans of distressed but viable ¯rms
instead of liquidating them. This eliminates the incentive to deviate from the
announced strategy and makes the liquidation threat self-enforcing. It implies that
even under perfect competition private banks can sustain pro¯ts in equilibrium.
Two of the model's assumptions merit additional explanation. First, by focusing
on the competition between the two types of banks, I implicitly assume that ¯rms
do not have other sources of external funding. In particular, they cannot issue
stocks or bonds. This seems a realistic assumption for the sector of small and
medium-sized enterprises, which form a large part of the economy, for example,
in Germany. In addition, it applies to almost all ¯rms in countries with less
developed ¯nancial markets. However, ruling out other sources of funding also
means that I ignore any implications that the competition between banks and
¯nancial markets may have on the behavior of banks. (For literature on how
di®erent ¯rms choose between bank ¯nance and, e.g., bonds, see Diamond, 1991,
Houston and James, 1996, Johnson, 1997, Bolton and Freixas, 2000). For example,
in the model of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) banks compete with ¯nancial
markets. There, establishing a reputation for auditing ¯rms in distress creates
a competitive advantage for the bank over bond holders. Obviously, their result
contrasts sharply with mine, and a combination of both strategies could hardly
be pursued. Which strategy a bank prefers may ultimately depend on the relative
importance of the di®erent groups of customers.
The second important assumption is the perceived restriction of the public bank's
objective function. The evidence on what objective public banks actually follow is
mixed. Bichsel and Spielmann (2004) do not ¯nd that public banks in Switzerland1
set lower rates than private ones, suggesting that they maximize pro¯ts just as
their private competitors. In contrast, Sapienza (2002) ¯nds that public banks
set lower rates than private banks in Italy, though she cannot clearly determine
the motive for this behavior. More generally, Yeyati, Micco and Panizza (2004)
¯nd no strong evidence for public banks either promoting or hindering economic
development.
However, public banks have a mandate to support the economy (see their statutes,
3e.g., in Germany and Switzerland). For example, in Germany public banks (\Spar-
kassen") are obliged to \ensure an appropriate and su±cient provision of money
and loans to all parts of the population and especially to small and medium-
sized enterprises" (x4, no. 1, NiedersÄ achsisches Sparkassengesetz 16.12.2004 /
15.11.2005). This means that, whatever their true objective function is, they are
not able to announce pro¯t maximization as their single goal, but at least have to
claim to follow policies in support of economic development.
In addition to this legal requirement, public banks indeed communicate to the pub-
lic a business policy which is not exclusively based on pro¯t maximization. The
german association of (public) savings banks (Sparkassenverband) describes the
\orientation towards common welfare, based on economic performance" (DSGV,
2007) as one important pillar of its policy. This policy receives support by the so
called \regional principle", which limits the public banks' activities to a certain
geographic region. Referring to this principle, public banks are perceived as hav-
ing a natural interest in the economic prosperity of the region they are based in
(see, e.g., SGK, 2006). The banks themselves enforce this perception by stating
explicitly that they \support the ¯rm even through critical times as long as it is
economically [..] justi¯able" (Sparkassen¯nanzgruppe, 2007). Overall, this strat-
egy seems to be successful in convincing people that public banks are di®erent
from private banks. For example, the Reader's Digest ¯nds that for all years be-
tween 2001 and 2007, the \Sparkassen" were the banks that Germans trusted most
(Reader's Digest, 2007). A similar picture arises in several other European coun-
tries where strong non-private banks exist (e.g., in Austria, France, Netherlands,
Switzerland and Russia, where public and cooperative banks head the list).
This justi¯es the assumption that a considerable share of ¯rms perceives public
banks as granting ¯rms in ¯nancial di±culties a chance to complete their projects
if they turn out to be viable. Apart from this perception, however, I do not assume
that public banks di®er in their policies from private banks. Rather, I analyze their
behavior as pro¯t maximizers. Hence, in contrast to the literature on soft budget
constraints (SBC; see, e.g., Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Maskin, 1996) I do
not assume that the state encourages the public bank to make unpro¯table loans,
but to assess the viability of all ¯rms in distress. Projects that are not viable
are liquidated. Hence, the interference of the state does not soften the budget
constraints of the public bank's borrowers, but restricts the bank's strategy space
within the scope of pro¯table business strategies. "Risky loans" in this context
are those with a positive, though lower net present value (NPV). Bad projects in
the sense of the SBC literature, i.e., projects with an ex-ante negative NPV, are
assumed to be detected through a pre-loan audit. This audit is able to distinguish
negative NPV from positive NPV projects, i.e., to determine the rough quality of a
project, but not to distinguish between di®erent types of pro¯table projects. This
assumption can be interpreted, e.g., as banks being able to assess the technological
4quality of a project, but not the quality of the management.
Note that if the public bank audits all ¯rms in distress and extends the loans
of viable ¯rms, the ¯rms' perception of the public bank being \nicer" than the
private banks is con¯rmed, even if the bank has the underlying objective of pro¯t
maximization. Accordingly, the ¯rms' beliefs of the public bank auditing ¯rms in
distress are equilibrium beliefs.
Contrary to some recent work that found state-owned banks to be less e±cient
than their privately-owned competitors (Caprio et al., 2004; La Porta et al., 2002),
I do not assume the public bank to be ine±cient per se. On the one hand, such
an assumption would obscure the focus of the paper, which is on the implications
of the competition between private and public banks. On the other hand, in some
countries, public banks were found to be as e±cient or even more e±cient than
private ¯nancial institutions (see Altunbas, Evans, Molyneux, 2001, for evidence
from Germany), such that no ¯nal conclusion can be drawn on the prevailing
situation.
The argument I develop is based on a simple self-selection mechanism as intro-
duced by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). But rather than themselves o®ering two
di®erent contracts, the private banks use the restriction of the public bank's strat-
egy space and o®er a contract that this bank is unable to o®er. There emerges a
separation of agents and principals, where the private banks separate intentionally,
while the public bank separates unintentionally. Since private banks have to keep
up this separation to stay in the market, positive pro¯ts persist despite perfect
competition.
In sections 2 and 3 I develop the model and describe the pooling equilibrium.
Separation is analyzed in section 4, while section 5 derives the credibility condition.
Section 6 concludes. Proofs are in the appendix.
2 Model
There are two types of ¯rms, safe and risky, indexed s and r, respectively. Firm
types are private information, i.e., only the ¯rm itself knows its type. Each ¯rm
has a single investment project that requires external ¯nance in t = 0 and produces
output xj in t = 1, j 2 fs;rg (see ¯gure 1 for the sequence of events). Investment
is normalized to 1. All projects have non-negative net present value. As mentioned
above, this could be the result of a pre-contract audit, which assesses the hard
facts of a project, but not the soft facts like the risk attitude of the management,
its skill, etc. Lending occurs recurrently in each period, and loan contracts are
5o®ered simultaneously. In this and the next two sections, I analyze only one loan
cycle, t = 0 to t = 1. In section 5 I extent the analysis to an in¯nite horizon.







Firms know their type.
Some ¯rms enter
into ¯nancial distress.
Banks audit or liquidate them.
Banks that audit learn





In t = 1
2, some ¯rms enter into ¯nancial distress. In this case, with probability pv
the ¯rm is viable and able to produce output xj in t = 1. With probability 1¡pv
it produces nothing. The a priori quality of a ¯rm (safe or risky) is not related
to the probability that a distressed ¯rm is viable. If liquidated in t = 1
2, ¯rms of
either type return a liquidation value of y.
Safe ¯rms have a lower probability of distress than risky ¯rms, ps < pr, and a
higher expected output, (1 ¡ ps)xs > (1 ¡ pr)xr. But their output in case of
success is lower than that of risky ¯rms, xs < xr. This assumption captures the
fact that risky ¯rms are not bad per se but might well have a higher possible
output than safe ¯rms, e.g., because their managers take higher risks. Relaxing
this assumption strengthens rather than weakens the argument.
There are two types of banks in the market: an incumbent public bank, indexed
pu, and a number of private banks, indexed pr, that attempt to enter the market.
In the model, the sector of private banks is treated as one entity. Neither type
is assumed to be budget-constrained, i.e., both could serve the whole market.
However, banks are not allowed to incur expected losses in any period. This means
that I do not consider price wars as in the entry games of Benoit (1983,1984) or
Fulghieri and Nagarajan (1996), where banks can ¯ght competitors at the price
of making losses in these periods. The public bank holds a state guarantee on
its liabilities and enjoys lower funding costs than the private banks, rpu < rpr,
where ri with i 2 fpu;prg includes face value and interest. Ri denotes the loan
repayment that bank i charges its borrowers, with Ri ¸ ri ¸ 1.
Financial distress in t = 1
2 gives banks the right to foreclose loans, even though
the loans are due only in t = 1. This may be due, e.g., to the ¯rm defaulting on
coupon payments (which I do not explicitly model). An alternative interpretation
is that the bank does not grant an essential follow up loan, which leads to the
6insolvency of the ¯rm due to liquidity problems.
Distress can be caused by two events. First, temporary liquidity shortages can
force economically viable ¯rms into distress. These ¯rms produce output xj in
t = 1 if their loan is extended. Second, ¯rms can be unpro¯table due to, e.g.,
strategic mistakes, unfavorable market development etc. that occurred between
t = 0 and t = 1
2. These ¯rms will not produce output in t = 1 even if their loan
is extended. Their value in t = 1 is zero. Hence, in t = 1
2 it is e±cient for a bank
to extend the loan in the ¯rst case but liquidate the ¯rm in the second.
To distinguish the two cases, banks can audit ¯rms. The audit reveals unpro¯table
¯rms with certainty and viable ¯rms with an error margin. q denotes the quality
of the audit, i.e., the conditional probability that an economically viable ¯rm in
¯nancial distress is identi¯ed as such.1 If the ¯rm is identi¯ed as viable, the bank
extends its loan but renegotiates the loan contract to obtain a share kj of the
output. The ¯rm's output xj is known in t = 1
2, i.e., the ¯rm type is revealed
through the audit. For the renegotiation, I assume a form of Nash bargaining
where both players receive equal shares of the surplus over the original repayment,
xj¡Ri
2 , and the bank additionally receives its repayment Ri. Hence, the bank
receives a share kj =
xj+Ri
2xj of xj, while the ¯rm receives 1 ¡ kj =
xj¡Ri
2xj of xj.
The audit is assumed to have a positive expected value, i.e., it is ex-ante e±cient
to audit all ¯rms in distress. Since it does not a®ect the argument, I set the
discount factor between t = 0 and t = 1 to one.
3 Pooling
Consider the static game where banks interact only once. The two types of banks
simultaneously enter the market for loans, and compete for borrowers. Since
auditing ¯rms in distress is ex-ante e±cient, it is a dominant strategy in the static
game. Accordingly, private banks cannot credibly commit to liquidating ¯rms in
distress. This means that they cannot separate borrower types, since all ¯rms
would be attracted if they o®ered a lower repayment. The quality of the audit is
assumed to be the same for all banks, e.g., as the result of a commonly available
audit technique. Banks compete only in loan repayments. Firms then obtain
pro¯ts under pooling of
P
pool
j = (xj ¡ R
pool




1This means that I assume the audit to produce Type II error of 1¡q but no Type I error (see
Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994, for a similar renegotiation outcome). A possible explanation
for this assumption is that banks only renegotiate a loan if they are certain that the expected
output will be produced. If there are doubts, they prefer to liquidate. I do not explicitly include
costs of the audit. However, they would strengthen rather than weaken the argument.
7where R
pool
i denotes the repayment that bank i charges a pooled ¯rm population.
Given the ¯rms' participation constraints, P
pool
j ¸ 0, banks can charge maximum
repayments of Rmax
r = xr for risky ¯rms and Rmax
s = xs for safe ¯rms. Since
xs < xr by assumption, xs is binding for the repayment if a bank wants to lend
to all ¯rms.
However, depending on the parameters, it may be more pro¯table for a bank to
set R
pool
i = xr and lend to risky ¯rms only, instead of serving the whole market at
a repayment of xs. Since credit rationing is not the focus of this paper, I assume
that the share Á of safe ¯rms in the population is large enough such that credit
rationing is not pro¯table for the banks, i.e., the pro¯t from lending to safe ¯rms





(xr ¡ xs)(1 ¡ pr + 1
2prpvq)
(1 ¡ ps)xs + ps(y + pvq(xs ¡ y))
:













i ) ¡ y))]
+ (1 ¡ Á)[(1 ¡ pr)R
pool





i ) ¡ y))]
| {z }
exp. pro¯t from lending to risky ¯rms
¡ri:
Neither type of bank is allowed to incur losses in expectation, i.e., banks' par-
ticipation constraints are given by ¦
pool





2(ri ¡ ¹ py) + pvq(2¹ py ¡ ¹ px)
2(1 ¡ ¹ p) + pvq¹ p
(1)
where ¹ p = Áps + (1 ¡ Á)pr and ¹ px = Ápsxs + (1 ¡ Á)prxr.
With rpu < rpr, the public bank can charge a lower repayment than the private
banks. Here as in the rest of the paper, I assume that if ¯rms are indi®erent
between the two banks, they stay with their status quo bank. Since the public
bank is the incumbent, initially it is the status quo bank for all ¯rms. Accordingly,
if banks compete, the public bank can o®er Rpool
pu = Rpool;min
pr , the lowest pro¯table
rate of the private banks, and lend to all ¯rms in the market. The results for a
pooled market are summarized in proposition 1
Proposition 1 .
i) Consider the situation where A1 is ful¯lled and the public bank is the only lender
8in the market. In equilibrium the public bank with audit policy q charges all ¯rms
Rpool¤
pu = xs and serves the whole market.
ii) Consider the situation where A1 is ful¯lled and the public bank competes with
private banks in the market for loans. In equilibrium the public bank with audit
policy q charges all ¯rms Rpool¤
pu = minfxs;Rpool;min
pr g and serves the whole market.
The proof is in the appendix.
4 Separation
Consider now the case when it is the private banks' policy never to audit any ¯rm
in distress. In this section, I will simply assume that this policy is credible in
the stage game, and that private banks cannot credibly change their policy from
one period to the next. The conditions under which this is actually the case are
derived in section 5.
As before, in each period all banks enter the market simultaneously. If loans were
granted in the previous period, outcomes are realized and payments made before
new loans are made.
Firms obtain pro¯ts under separation of
P
sep;pu








j = (1 ¡ pj)(xj ¡ Rsep
pr )
from the public and private bank loan, respectively, with Rsep
pu and Rsep
pr denoting
the banks' repayments under separation. As before, maximum repayments from
¯rms' participation constraints are Rmax
r = xr and Rmax
s = xs. Separation is
obtained if ¯rms self-select, i.e., if risky ¯rms prefer the loan of the public bank,




r for risky ¯rms and
Psep;pu
s < Psep;pr
s for safe ¯rms.
From these constraints it follows that given the public bank's repayment Rpu,
private banks have to charge a minimum repayment to deter risky ¯rms from
choosing its loan of
Rmin




9To attract safe ¯rms they can charge a maximum repayment just below
Rmax
pr = Rpu ¡
ps
2(1 ¡ ps)
pvq(xs ¡ Rpu) : (2)
Banks obtain pro¯ts per contract of
¦sep
pu = (1 ¡ pr)Rsep




pu ) ¡ y)) ¡ rpu
¦sep
pr = (1 ¡ ps)Rsep
pr + psy ¡ rpr :
From their participation constraints (non-negative expected pro¯ts) result the
minimum feasible repayments that banks can charge under separation as
Rsep;min
pu =
rpu ¡ pry ¡ prpvq(1
2xr ¡ y)







Separation is feasible if the minimum repayment that private banks have to set
under separation in order not to make losses is lower than the maximum repayment
they can set in order to attract safe ¯rms. If the public bank tries to avoid
separation, i.e., market entry of private banks, the lowest repayment it can charge
is Rpool;min
pu from (1), which depends on rpu. This de¯nes the critical disadvantage
in funding costs r¤
pr, such that private banks with funding costs below r¤
pr are able
to enter the market:
r¤





pu ) ¡ y):
The details are in the appendix.
Assuming the credibility of the liquidation threat, the competitive equilibrium of
the stage game is then de¯ned as follows:
In equilibrium, private banks set the minimum feasible separation repayment from
(3), while the public bank sets the maximum repayment that ensures separation
















I now drop the assumption that the private banks' audit policy is credible and
derive instead the conditions under which this is the case. For this I consider the
10game in which the lending process of the stage game is repeated an in¯nite number
of times. The private banks' discount factor, re°ecting their time preference and
continuation probability (or time horizon), is ±. Firms live only for one period,
but information regarding the banks' behavior is transmitted from one generation
of ¯rms to the next; it is common knowledge.
The assumption of ¯rms living only for one period is a simpli¯cation that can be
interpreted as follows. Each period, some ¯rms newly enter the market and some
drop out. For those ¯rms that stay, the management may change or they may
invest in new projects. This means that a ¯rm that was of safe type in period t
(and could be identi¯ed as such since it took a loan from a private bank) is not
necessarily of safe type in period t + 1. Accordingly, the public bank cannot give
¯rms contract o®ers according to their type. The information asymmetry persists
and hence the chance for the private banks to separate ¯rms.
Since the audit is assumed to have a higher expected return than liquidation, the
public bank's policy to audit distressed ¯rms is self-enforcing. For the private
banks, credibility has to be achieved through reputation building. However, stick-
ing to the threat to liquidate distressed ¯rms without an audit leaves both players,
bank and viable ¯rm, worse o® in the short run. Although the bank can execute
the liquidation threat because distress gives it power over the ¯rm, short-term
rational behavior would induce it to audit all ¯rms, as the expected return from
the audit exceeds the liquidation value. Given rational expectations, risky ¯rms
would anticipate the bank's deviation from its liquidation policy and free-ride on
the cheaper loan.
In order to make foregoing short-term pro¯ts from the audit pro¯table, and thus
the liquidation threat credible and self-enforcing, the discounted pro¯ts from lend-
ing to safe ¯rms in the future have to exceed the expected pro¯ts from extending
the loan of distressed but economically viable ¯rms today. Given the private
banks' repayment under separation, Rsep








pr ) ¡ y) (4)
where ¦(Rsep
pr ) is the banks' pro¯t per contract if charging repayment Rsep
pr . The
details are in the appendix. If a private bank deviates from its liquidation strategy,
the credibility of the liquidation threat is lost. Risky ¯rms are then attracted
by the lower repayment and separation fails. Accordingly, private banks cannot
change their audit policy from one period to the next without compromising the
policy's credibility. This justi¯es the assumption of section 4.
In the competitive equilibrium of section 4, the pro¯ts of the private banks are
zero, such that (4) would fail. In order for credibility to be achieved, the pro¯t of
the private banks must be positive. This means that for a separating equilibrium
that ensures credibility to exist, the following condition has to be satis¯ed: The
11minimum repayment from (4) that private banks have to set in order to credibly
commit to liquidation and separate borrowers is lower than the maximum repay-
ment from (2) they can set in order to attract safe ¯rms, given that the public
bank sets its lowest feasible pooling rate from (1). This yields the critical rate r¤¤
pr
for the private banks' funding costs as
r¤¤





2(rpu¡¹ py)+pvq(2¹ py¡ ¹ px)
2(1¡¹ p)+pvq¹ p ¡
ps
2(1¡ps)pvq(xs ¡
2(rpu¡¹ py)+pvq(2¹ py¡ ¹ px)
2(1¡¹ p)+pvq¹ p ).
In the competitive equilibrium of the repeated game, the private banks then set
repayments such that (4) is ful¯lled with equality, while the public bank sets the
maximum separating repayment, given the equilibrium repayment of the private
banks.
Proposition 2 Assume that A1 is satis¯ed and rpr < r¤¤
pr. In the competitive
equilibrium of the in¯nitely repeated game, private banks liquidate all ¯rms in




2xs ¡ y) ¡ psy + rpr
1 ¡ ps ¡ 1¡±
2 pspvq
:












pr, all private banks make positive pro¯ts in equilibrium. Even per-
fect competition between private banks does not drive pro¯ts to zero, because
this would render the liquidation threat non-credible by violating condition (4).
Separation would then fail and the private banks would be forced to leave the
market.
Data on the German loan market con¯rms this separation result. For a sample of
3500 small and medium-sized ¯rms in Germany, it shows that 73% of the ¯rms that
characterize their own creditworthiness as \bad" (risky ¯rms) borrow from public
banks, vs. only 19% that borrow from private banks. In contrast, of the ¯rms that
report to have a \good" creditworthiness (safe ¯rms), only 51% borrow from public
banks, but 30% from private banks (Paul et al, 2003). This tendency is consistent
with data which shows that public banks in Germany disproportionately lend to
very small ¯rms (BDS/DGV, 2007), which are usually perceived as being riskier
than larger ¯rms.
12What does separation mean for borrowers? As usual in self-selection models, the
riskier ¯rms are worse o® under separation than under pooling. However, since
private banks can sustain positive pro¯ts in equilibrium, safe ¯rms may also be
charged higher rates under separation than under pooling. In particular, if
1 ¡ ± >
(rpr ¡ psy)a ¡ (1 ¡ ps)b
1
2pspvq((2y ¡ xs)a ¡ b
with a = (2(1¡¹ p)+pvq¹ p) and b = (2(rpr¡¹ py)+pvq(2¹ py¡ ¹ px)), then Rpool¤
pu < R¤¤
pr.
That is, if the private banks' discount factor is su±ciently low (but still high
enough to achieve separation), safe ¯rms pay higher rates under separation than
under pooling.
6 Conclusion
Most public banks directly or indirectly hold state guarantees on their deposits and
enjoy lower funding costs than their privately owned competitors. This is often
blamed to distort competition in favor of the public banks. The model shows that
if public banks also have the mandate to support economic development, private
banks can enter the market despite their cost disadvantage. With the public bank
being perceived as supporting borrowers in ¯nancial distress, private banks have
an instrument to separate ¯rms and lend only to the safe types. This does not
depend on the public bank's true objective function. Data on the German loan
market con¯rms this result.
Interestingly, since the private banks' liquidation strategy is not credible if they
earn zero pro¯ts, positive pro¯ts are sustainable in equilibrium even if there is
perfect competition between private banks. The entry of private banks into the
market may then lead to a deterioration of lending conditions for all ¯rms, relative
to the situation when private banks can only threaten to enter into the pooled
market. The restriction of the public bank's policy space, which is meant to
support economic development, may therefore result in the opposite e®ect.
Economic policy makers seem to react to the initially mentioned argument of
competition distortion by state guarantees. For example, to comply with EU
standards, the state's guarantee for its banks' liabilities was abandoned in Ger-
many in July 2005. This was advertised as a step towards a level playing ¯eld
for public and private banks. The results of this paper, however, cast doubt on
this conclusion. Rather, they imply that as long as public banks are perceived as
being restricted in setting their policy - and data suggest that they are - while
private banks are not, competition is potentially distorted, with all the adverse
e®ects this may induce. If economic policy makers want public banks to continue
13supporting the economic development, but otherwise want to foster free compe-
tition, the conditions on the loan market may not respond as desired. The true
e®ect on loan conditions, however, is ultimately an empirical question, and should
be subject of future research.
14Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Part i)
xr > xs per assumption. If the public bank sets Rpool
pu > xr, it violates the
participation constraints of all ¯rms, does not lend and obtains zero pro¯t. If it
sets Rpool
pu < xs it lends to all ¯rms, but obtains lower pro¯ts than with Rpool
pu = xs.
If it sets xs < Rpool
pu · xr, it lends only to risky ¯rms. Per assumption, this is
less pro¯table for all Rpool
pu · xr than lending to the whole population at xs.
u
Part ii)
First, for xs < Rpool;min
pu the proof of part i) applies. Second, xs > Rpool;min
pu . If
the private banks o®er a repayment below Rpool;min
pr they incur losses. If the
public bank charges Rpool
pu < Rpool;min
pu it serves the whole market as before,
but makes lower pro¯ts. If it charges Rpool
pu > Rpool;min
pu , the private banks of-
fer Rpool;min




The maximum repayment the private banks can set in order to attract safe ¯rms,
dependent on the public bank's repayment, is given by safe ¯rms' incentive con-
straint as
Rmax







The lowest feasible repayment the public bank can set under separation is Rsep;min
pu











as the highest incentive compatible repayment the private banks can charge if the
public bank competes with its lowest feasible separation repayment. In order for
the private banks' participation constraint to be met, Rmax
pr has to exceed their
minimum repayment under separation, Rsep;min













15Solving (6) for rpr yields
r¤





pu ) ¡ y)
Derivation of the credibility condition (4)
The pro¯t that is lost per contract per period if distressed but viable ¯rms are
liquidated is given by pspvq(1
2(xs + Rsep
pr ) ¡ y). The private banks lend to safe
¯rms, of which ps enter into distress. A share pv of these is viable, but only q
of them would be identi¯ed as such in an audit. Compared to liquidating them,
the private bank would obtain an increase in pro¯ts by extending their loans of
1
2(xs + Rsep
pr ) ¡ y.
The pro¯t the private bank forgoes by having to leave the market after having
lost the credibility of its liquidation threat is determined as the present value of
obtaining the pro¯t ¦(Rsep
pr ) from cooperation in in¯nitely many periods, given its
discount factor ±.
Note that since the number of ¯rms a private bank lends to is the same over time
as long as the market does not change, if the credibility condition holds for one
contract, it holds for an arbitrary number of contracts a bank sells each period.
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